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Abstract
By analysing an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate stochas-
tically between low and high states and where firms follow a price-matching
punishment strategy, we demonstrate that the best collusive prices are rigid
over time when the two cost levels are sufficiently close. This provides game
theoretic support for the results of the kinked demand curve. In contrast to
the kinked demand curve, it also generates predictions regarding the level and
the determinants of the best collusive price, which in turn has implications
for the corresponding collusive profits. The relationships between such price
rigidity and the expected duration of a high-cost phase, the degree of product
differentiation, and the number of firms in the market are also investigated.
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1 Introduction
The old theory of the kinked demand curve (Hall and Hitch, 1939; and Sweezy, 1939)
was the first attempt to formalise the long-standing belief that tacit collusion and
price rigidity are linked. It assumes that there is a prevailing focal price and that
rivals will match a firm’s price decrease but they will not match a price increase.
This rivalry implies that each firm’s demand curve has a kink at the focal price,
and it follows from the resultant discontinuity in marginal revenue curve that prices
remain constant at the focal level for a range of marginal costs. Although the rivalry
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of the kinked demand curve has an intuitive appeal and some anecdotal support,
this theory has been heavily criticised (for example see Tirole, 1988, p.243-245).
Contemporary models of dynamic oligopolistic interaction differ in two respects
with the kinked demand curve. First, they are modelled as an explicit dynamic
game using the theory of repeated games, where collusive prices are sustainable
when the short-term gain from any deviation is outweighed by the long-term loss
from a credible retaliation. Second, firms usually more than match lower deviation
prices, because the most commonly analysed retaliations are “Nash reversion” (see
Friedman, 1971) and “optimal punishment strategies” (see Abreu, 1986, 1988). Us-
ing such models, there is a theoretical literature that analyses the effect of temporary
changes in market conditions on the best collusive prices that achieve the highest
levels of profit possible (for example see Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger
and Harrington, 1991).1 A feature of this literature is that, barring the special cir-
cumstances when incentives are perfectly aligned, the best collusive prices are not
rigid over time. This is at odds with the results of the kinked demand curve and
with the belief that tacit collusion and price rigidity are linked.
In this paper, we analyse the rivalry of the kinked demand curve in an infinitely
repeated game and show that, in contrast to the previous collusion literature, the
best collusive prices can be rigid over time despite small industry-wide changes in
unit costs. This provides game theoretic support for the results of the kinked de-
mand curve. We derive this result by extending Lu and Wright (2010) who analyse
an infinitely repeated game where, similar to the kinked demand curve, firms match
lower deviation prices (provided they are above the one-shot Nash equilibrium price)
but do not match higher deviation prices. They show that collusive prices are sus-
tainable under such “price-matching punishments” when products are symmetrically
differentiated and when market conditions do not vary over time. We extend their
model so that unit costs alternate stochastically between high and low states, and
analyse the characteristics of the best collusive subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
when prices are rigid over time.
The intuition behind price rigidity in our model is that when unit costs are
temporarily high today and they are permanently low in the future, there is an
incentive to deviate today from any collusive price above the collusive price that
prevails in the future. The reason is that when a firm deviates to that future price
today, there is no long-term loss to offset the deviation gain, because the punishment
is just to match the deviation price, which still results in the collusive price being set
in the future. An implication of this is that the best collusive prices are rigid when
the two cost levels are sufficiently close, such that the one-shot Nash equilibrium
1Although much of the previous literature focuses on changes in demand, many of the results
generalise to changes in costs.
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price of the high-cost state is not above the future collusive price. When high costs
persist into the future, price matching such a deviation does reduce the profits of
future high-cost states, but this long-term loss must outweigh the initial gain for
procyclical prices to be sustainable. Given this loss is small and the gain is large
when the two cost levels are close, the best collusive prices are rigid over time when
the difference between the two cost levels is below some critical threshold. We show
that this critical threshold falls as high-cost states are likely to persist for longer
into the future, and it equals zero when the high-cost state is expected to last
permanently.
In contrast to the kinked demand curve, our model generates predictions regard-
ing the level of the best rigid price and the effects of the other parameters of the
model on it. This price uniquely achieves the highest level of profit possible, given
that the price does not vary over time. It defines the best collusive price in both cost
states when the difference between the two cost levels is below the critical threshold,
and it is always between the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the high-cost state
and the monopoly price of the low-cost state for such conditions. The best rigid price
is determined by the incentives to collude in low-cost states, and it monotonically
increases with the level of high costs at a rate that is less than one-to-one. An im-
plication of these features is that when the best collusive prices are rigid over time,
the resultant per-period collusive profits of low-cost states are strictly increasing in
the level of high costs, but such profits of high-cost states are strictly decreasing in
the level of high costs. In contrast, the corresponding present discounted values of
collusive profits are strictly decreasing in the level of high costs, whether the initial
period has high or low costs.
Our model also generates predictions regarding the relationship between price
rigidity and the number of firms in the market, which has been investigated by several
empirical studies (for example see Carlton, 1986, 1989). This relationship ultimately
depends upon the degree of product differentiation. Based on an example where
demand is derived from the constant elasticity of substitution version of Spence-
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (Spence, 1976; and Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977), we show
that the best collusive prices are rigid for the largest difference between the two
cost levels when products are differentiated by an intermediate degree. This is
because price-matching punishments do not support collusive prices when products
are homogeneous, and since firms can set the monopoly prices when they have no
close rivals. Finally, we find that the best collusive prices are rigid for a larger
difference between the two cost levels in a concentrated market, with few firms,
than in a less concentrated market, with a greater number of firms, when the degree
of product differentiation is sufficiently low.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
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literature and provides anecdotal support for a link between price matching and
price rigidity. Section 3 outlines the assumptions on demand and costs, and it
formally defines the price-matching punishment strategy. In section 4, we first find
the conditions for which the best collusive prices are rigid over time. We then analyse
the relationship between such price rigidity and the expected duration of a sequence
of high-cost states, and after that we investigate the effects of such price rigidity and
fluctuating costs on the best collusive profits. Section 5 places more structure on
demand to investigate the effects of both the degree of product differentiation and
the number of firms in the market on such price rigidity, and section 6 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related Literature and Evidence
In this paper, we propose that the expectation that lower deviation prices will be
matched can lead to price rigidity during collusive phases, and there is some anec-
dotal support for a link between the two. Slade (1987, 1992) analysed a price war
between gasoline retailers during 1983 in Vancouver (see also Slade, 1990). She
found that there was “a high degree of (lagged) price matching during the war” and
that “prices before and after the war were uniform across firms and stable over time”
(1992, p.264). In fact, “after the price war came to an end, prices were stable for
nearly a year” (1987, p.515). Slade (1989, p.295) also argues that other Canadian
markets (including nickel, cigarette, as well as gasoline) had three stylised facts:
“First, price is the choice variable and it can be observed by all. Second, price wars
are occasional events and are separated by periods of stable prices. Third, during
a war there is considerable matching of prices”. Similarly, Kalai and Satterthwaite
(1994) state that between 1900 and 1958 small firms in the US steel industry believed
that the largest producer would match their prices if they undercut it, and observed
that “Before World War II certain classes of steel products showed remarkable price
rigidity” (p.31).2
The anecdotal evidence above suggests that, in at least some situations, price
matching is a relevant form of firm behaviour, and this is re-emphasised by Slade’s
(1987) empirical evidence that finds some support for strategies, similar to price
matching, where “small deviations lead to small punishments” over Nash reversion
(p.499). This contrasts with the informal reasoning that argues that since collusion
is easier to sustain under harsher punishments, then colluding firms would employ
the harshest credible punishment. The evidence above also suggests that our price
2Levenstein (1997) and Genesove and Mullin (2001) also find that some cartel price wars consisted
of mild punishments and price matching, respectively, but due to infrequent price observations it is
not possible to determine the extent to which prices vary over time.
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rigidity result may be of some empirical relevance for such situations where price
matching is prevalent. This differs to previous attempts to model the rivalry of the
kinked demand curve in dynamic settings, because they do not find a link between
price matching and price rigidity.3
Our model also contrasts with the literature that analyses collusion when mar-
ket conditions vary over time. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that under Nash
reversion the deviation gains are greatest in a temporary boom but the long-term
losses are constant when future market conditions are independent of current condi-
tions. This implies that any price that is just sustainable in a low-cost boom is easier
to sustain in a high-cost bust, so the best collusive prices are procyclical. For similar
reasons, the incentive to deviate from a rigid price is greatest in a period of low costs
under price-matching punishments, when future fluctuations in costs are indepen-
dent of or positively correlated with the current level. However, procyclical collusive
prices may not be sustainable, because there is a discontinuity in the incentives to
collude at the rigid price in high-cost states. This is because price matching reduces
only the price set in future high-cost states when a firm deviates in a period of high
costs by reducing its price to the low-cost price that prevails in low-cost periods.
Therefore, such a deviation from a price above yet very close to the low-cost price
can generate a much smaller long-term loss than an otherwise identical deviation
from the low-cost price, where price matching reduces the prices set in all future
periods. Yet, the deviation gains are effectively the same for such deviations. As
a result, a deviation in a period of high costs from a price only slightly above the
low-cost price can be profitable, even though a deviation from the low-cost price will
be strictly unprofitable.
Finally, this paper is also related to Athey et al (2004) who develop an alterna-
tive model of collusive price rigidity, where prices are publicly observable but firms
experience private shocks to their unit costs in each period. They show that the
best collusive prices under Nash reversion may be rigid over time because, although
demand is not allocated to the most efficient firm, this inefficiency can be outweighed
by the benefit of detecting deviations easily.4 Their model is similar to Green and
Porter (1984) since, due to some information asymmetry, price wars can occur on
3Bhaskar (1988) and Kalai and Satterthwaite (1994) show that price rigidity does not occur in
a one-shot game when lower prices can be matched immediately before profits are realised. In an
infinitely repeated game where a duopoly alternates between committing to price for two periods,
Maskin and Tirole (1988) show that price rigidity can occur in a Markov perfect equilibrium when
costs fall permanently, because firms attempt to avoid a price war. However, this is because rivals
more than match lower prices. In another related infinitely repeated game, Slade (1989) captures
the three stylised facts discussed above when an unexpected change in demand is anticipated to be
permanent, but stable prices only occur in her model when the new equilibrium is reached.
4 In a similar model, Hanazono and Yang (2007) show that price rigidity can also occur with
unobservable demand fluctuations.
5
the equilibrium path when firms receive a bad signal. In contrast, price wars do not
occur on the equilibrium path in our model, because there is symmetric information.
Instead, the successfulness of collusion is affected by market conditions in a simi-
lar way as Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Our model adds to our understanding of
price rigidity because it is the first to consider the relationship between price rigidity
and the degree of product differentiation, and it can be tested empirically since it
does not rely on parameters that are likely to be unobservable to an econometrician.
3 The Model
3.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a market where a fixed number of n ≥ 2 firms each produce a single
differentiated product and compete in observable prices over an infinite number of
periods. In any period t, firms have constant unit costs, ct ≥ 0, face no fixed costs,
and have a common discount factor, δ ∈ (0, 1). They simultaneously choose price in
each period and the demand of firm i = 1, . . . , n in period t is qi(pit,p−it, n) where
pit is its own price and p−it is the vector of its rivals’ prices. Demand is symmetric,
strictly decreasing in pit and limpit→∞ qi(pit,p−it, n) = 0. Since firms are symmetric,
at equal prices pit = pt for all i, qi(pt, pt, n) = q(pt)/n where q(pt) is independent of
n. For every price vector pt=(pit,p−it) where qi(pit,p−it, n) > 0 for all i, demand
is twice continuously differentiable and from Vives (2001, p.148-152) we assume it
has the following standard properties:
Assumption 1.
??? ∂qi∂pit
??? >
?
j =i
∂qi
∂pjt
> 0
Assumption 2. ∂
2qi
∂pit∂pjt
≥ 0 ∀ j 	= i
Assumption 3. ∂
2qi
∂p2it
+
?
j =i
∂2qi
∂pit∂pjt
< 0.
These assumptions imply that products are imperfect substitutes, demand ex-
hibits increasing differences in (pit, pjt) and the own effect of a price change domi-
nates the cross effect both in terms of the level and slope of demand.
Firm i’s per-period profit in period t is πit(pit,p−it; ct, n) = (pit−ct)qi(pit,p−it, n),
where at equal prices pit = pt for all i write πit(pt, pt; ct, n) = πt(pt; ct, n). Assump-
tions 1 and 2 imply that prices are strategic complements:
∂2πit
∂pit∂pjt
> 0 ∀ j 	= i ∀ t. (1)
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Since unit costs are constant in any period, Assumptions 1 and 3 are sufficient to
ensure the best reply mapping is a contraction (see Vives, 2001, p.150):
∂2πit
∂p2it
+
?
j =i
∂2πit
∂pit∂pjt
< 0 ∀ t. (2)
This guarantees the existence of a unique one-shot Nash equilibrium price in pure
strategies, denoted pN (ct, n). It follows from (1) and (2) that each firm’s per-period
profit is strictly concave in its own price (i.e. ∂2πit/∂p2it < 0), which implies that if
rivals charge a price above pN (ct, n), then a firm can strictly increase its per-period
profit by unilaterally lowering its price towards the one-shot Nash equilibrium price
(i.e. ∂πit/∂pit < 0 ∀ pjt > pN (ct, n), j 	= i). Assumption 1 guarantees that pN (ct, n)
is strictly increasing in ct and to ensure that pN (ct, n) is strictly decreasing in n, we
assume the following sufficient condition:
Assumption 4. ∂
2qi
∂pit∂n
< 0.
Finally, to ensure that the monopoly price, pm(ct), is unique with pm(ct) >
pN (ct, n) we assume:
Assumption 5. d
2πt
dp2t
= ∂
2πit
∂p2it
+ 2
?
j =i
∂2πit
∂pit∂pjt
+ ∂
2πit
∂p2jt
< 0 ∀ t.
An implication of Assumption 5 is that if all firms set the same price below the
monopoly price, then they would strictly increase their per-period profits if all set
a higher price (i.e. dπt/dpt > 0 ∀ pN (ct, n) ≤ pt < pm(ct)). Assumption 1 ensures
that pm(ct) is strictly increasing in ct, while the symmetry assumptions on demand
and costs guarantee that pm(ct) is independent of n.
3.2 Cost fluctuations
In any period, unit costs can be low or high such that ct = 0 or ct = c > 0. To
simplify notation, write pN (0, n) = pN (n), pm(0) = pm and πit(pit,p−it; 0, n) =
πit(pit,p−it;n). The current level is common knowledge before firms set prices, and
expectations of future levels of ct for all t follow a Markov process such that:
λ ≡ Pr (ct = c| ct−1 = 0) ∈ (0, 1)
θ ≡ Pr (ct = 0| ct−1 = c) ∈ (0, 1)
μ ≡ Pr (c0 = c) ∈ [0, 1].
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Thus, λ is the transition probability associated with moving from a low-cost state
to one of high costs, and θ is the probability that corresponds with a transition from
high costs to low costs. The parameter μ describes how the system begins.
This process implies that the probability that costs will be high in the next
period is λ if they are currently low, otherwise it is 1 − θ. Thus, future costs are
independent of the current level if 1 − θ − λ = 0, and this simple case provides a
benchmark for our analysis. In many industries it is natural to expect that future
costs will be positively correlated with the current level. Consequently, we also
allow for the case where 1 − θ − λ > 0, which implies that it is more likely that
the current cost level will continue into the next period than change. Following the
terminology of Bagwell and Staiger (1997), we refer to the former as zero correlation
(1− θ − λ = 0) and the latter as positive correlation (1− θ − λ > 0).
3.3 Collusive prices and profits
Due to the Markov process that determines future cost levels, collusive profits are
the same in any high-cost state regardless of the specific date, other things equal,
and likewise for any low-cost state. Thus, the best collusive prices emerge as a pair,
and we wish to find the conditions for which these are equal. Analysing the best
collusive prices is consistent with the prominent papers in the collusion literature
(for example see Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986; Haltiwanger and Harringtion, 1991),
and it is also consistent with the kinked demand curve since the most profitable
equilibrium is often argued to be the most logical (see Tirole, 1988, p.244).
Let the collusive prices of high- and low-cost states be p(c) and p(0), respectively,
and denote ΩH(p(c), p(0)) as a firm’s expected discounted profit in period t and
thereafter, if period t is a high-cost state. Similarly, denote ΩL(p(0), p(c)) as a
firm’s expected discounted profit in period t and thereafter, if period t is a low-cost
state. Suppressing notation slightly, it is possible to write such profits as:
ΩH = π(p(c); c, n) + δθΩL + δ(1− θ)ΩH
ΩL = π(p(0);n) + δλΩH + δ(1− λ)ΩL.
Solving for ΩH and ΩL gives:
ΩH(p(c), p(0)) = π(p(c); c, n) +
δ
1−δ
?
θ
ω
π(p(0);n) + (1− θ
ω
)π(p(c); c, n)
?
ΩL(p(0), p(c)) = π(p(0);n) +
δ
1−δ [
λ
ω
π(p(c); c, n) + (1− λ
ω
)π(p(0);n)],
where ω ≡ 1−δ(1−θ−λ) > 0, 0 < θ
ω
< 1 and 0 < λ
ω
< 1. The first terms on the right
hand-side of the above equations represent the profits from the initial periods, and
the second terms represent the discounted profits from all future periods, conditional
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on expectations of future cost levels.
3.4 Punishment strategy
Drawing on the insights of Lu and Wright (2010), we assume that firm i’s price-
matching punishment strategy profile for all t is of the form:
pi0 = p0(c0) = p(c0)
pit = pt(ct) =
?
p(ct) if pjτ = pτ (cτ ) ∀ j ∀ τ ∈ {0, . . . , t− 1}
max{pN (ct, n),min{pdt , p(ct)}} otherwise
(3)
where pdt is a vector of the history of deviation prices at period t (i.e. it includes
all prices where pjτ 	= pτ (cτ ) ∀ j ∀ τ ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}). This strategy calls for each
firm to set the initial collusive prices until a deviation. Following a deviation, the
lowest ever deviation price is matched in periods where it is above the one-shot
Nash equilibrium price and it is below the initial collusive price of that period. The
one-shot Nash equilibrium price is set in any period when the lowest ever deviation
price is below the one-shot Nash equilibrium price. Similarly, the initial collusive
price is set in any period when the lowest ever deviation price is above this collusive
price. This is repeated for future deviations.
price
time
pN(c,n)
ɒ+1
Z
pN(n)
Z
YY
X
pɒ(c)
ɒ+2 ɒ+3 ɒ+4 ɒ+5 ɒ+6ɒ
X XX
Y Y Y Y Y
Z Z
pɒ(0)
Figure 1: pricing after a one-stage deviation to X, Y and Z in period τ
Figure 1 illustrates the implications for pricing for various one-stage deviations in
period τ (i.e. where a firm deviates for one period, then conforms to (3) thereafter).
Understanding such deviations are important for our purposes, because we use the
one-stage deviation principle (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.108-110) to solve
for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. This principle states that a strategy profile
induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, if there is no history that leads to a
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subgame in which a deviant will choose an action that differs to the one prescribed by
the strategy, then conform to the strategy thereafter (assuming the deviant believes
others will also conform to the strategy). Thus, to prove subgame perfection, it
suffices to show that a one stage-deviation is not profitable in the initial collusive
subgames and nor are such deviations in every possible punishment subgame. We
say that collusive prices are supportable if the strategy profile in (3) is a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for all i = 1, . . . , n.
The collusive prices are initially procyclical in Figure 1, because firms set pτ (c)
and pτ (0) in high- and low-cost states, respectively. If a firm deviated to Y in period
τ , then Y is matched thereafter. If it deviated to Z, however, then Z is matched in
future low-cost states, otherwise pN (c, n) is set. Departing slightly from the kinked
demand curve but consistent with Lu and Wright (2010), firms do not match prices
below pN (ct, n) in period t because doing so seems unreasonable. This assumption is
not crucial in determining the range of rigid prices for which collusion is sustainable
or the parameter space where the best collusive prices are rigid. This is because a
deviation to Z is always less profitable than a deviation to Y in a period of low costs
when the best collusive prices are rigid, and a deviation to Z would never occur in
a period of high costs, even for prices that are not supportable. This assumption
ensures that (3) defines a Nash equilibrium in punishment subgames for histories
where the lowest ever deviation price is below pN (ct, n) in period t, and that it is
possible to check that (3) induces a Nash equilibrium in punishment subgames that
start with a period of low costs for histories where the lowest deviation price is
between pN (n) and pN (c, n).
The strategy profile (3) also has a similar feature for one-stage deviations to
prices above the lowest initial collusive price, because if a firm deviated to X, then
X is matched only in periods when the initial collusive price is above X, otherwise
pτ (0) is set. Figure 1 illustrates the case for procyclical prices, but it equally applies
to the case of countercyclical prices (where pτ (c) is set in low-cost states and pτ (0)
in high-cost states). This resembles the rivalry of the kinked demand curve, where
firms do not match price increases. This is because for deviations where a firm raises
its price from pτ (0) to a price above pτ (0), the deviation is never matched in future
low-cost states and it is also not matched in future high-cost states when there is
price rigidity. A slight difference is that X is not matched in future low-cost states,
if prices are procyclical and a firm lowered its price from pτ (c) to X in period τ .
However, the rationale for the strategy is the same: each firm expects to lose sales,
if it set X in periods when its rivals are expected to set pτ (0).5
5An alternative strategy is one where downward deviations from pt(c) to X are matched in all
future periods, other things equal. Since this alternative and (3) are equivalent for rigid prices, the
range of rigid prices sustainable and the characteristics of the best rigid price are the same. We
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4 Price Rigidity under Price-Matching Punishments
4.1 A Theory of Price Rigidity
We wish to find the conditions for which the best collusive prices are rigid. Prices are
procyclical when the level of high costs is so large that pN (c, n) > pm, so we initially
consider the case where c ∈ (0, c] such that pN (c, n) = pm. Similarly, price rigidity
can only occur when (3) defines a Nash equilibrium in subgames where firms should
set p, such that pN (n) ≤ p ≤ pN (c, n), in low-cost states and pN (c, n) in high-cost
states. Otherwise, there would be some punishment subgames where firms will not
conform to (3) for histories when the lowest ever deviation price is between pN (n)
and pN (c, n). Clearly a firm will not deviate from pN (c, n) in a period of high costs,
so consider firm i’s incentive to deviate from any such p in a period of low costs.
Firm i’s present discounted value of deviation profits if it sets the same or a lower
price pi ∈ [pN (n), p] in the initial period and then conforms to (3) thereafter is:
ΩziL(pi, p, p
N (c, n)) ≡ πi(pi, p;n) + δ1−δ [
λ
ω
π(pN (c, n); c, n) + (1− λ
ω
)π(pi;n)]. (4)
The first term on the right-hand side of (4) is the profit from the initial period.
The second term is the expected discounted profits from future periods, given pi
will be matched in future low-cost states but pN (c, n) is set in future high-cost
states. It follows from this that firm i will not deviate from p by setting pi if
ΩL(p, p
N (c, n)) ≥ ΩziL(pi, p, pN (c, n)) for all pi ∈ [pN (n), p].
Lemma 1 For every n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1) and 1− θ − λ ≥ 0, there exists a unique ?c ∈
(0, c) such that the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the high-cost state, pN (c, n),
and p, where pN (n) < p ≤ pN (c, n), are supportable in high- and low-cost states,
respectively, if and only if c ∈ (0,?c].
When the difference between the two cost levels is sufficiently small, pN (c, n) is
close enough to pN (n) such that a firm will not deviate from pN (c, n) in a collusive
subgame that starts with a period of low costs. This is because the deviation gain
from setting p between pN (n) and pN (c, n) is outweighed by the long-term loss from
matching p in future periods of low costs. In punishment subgames that start with
a period of low costs, the condition for a firm to want to deviate from p is the
same as the condition to deviate from pN (c, n), except that the price is lower. Since
focus on (3) because there is an asymmetry in this alternative strategy, since a firm is unable to
increase the low-cost price by raising its price from pt(0) to X in a period of low costs, but it is able
to by lowering its price from pt(c) to X in a period of high costs. An implication of this is that the
parameter space where the best collusive prices are rigid under (3) is a strict subset of that under
this alternative strategy, so it is robust to both strategies.
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the standard properties of the underlying competition game imply that it is less
profitable to deviate from a price close to pN (n) than a higher price, a firm will not
deviate in any such punishment subgame, if it will not deviate from pN (c, n) in the
collusive subgame. Consequently, the punishment is credible and harsh enough to
support pN (c, n) in both cost states when the difference between the two cost levels
is sufficiently small.
In the next subsection, we limit our attention to equilibria with the same price
pc > pN (c, n) in both cost states. This allows us to characterise the best rigid price
that achieves the highest level of profit possible, given that the price does not vary
over time. In the subsection after, we find the conditions for which firms can do no
better than set the best rigid price in both cost states.
4.1.1 Best rigid price
Under the conditions of Lemma 1, a rigid price pc is only supportable when firms
will not deviate from any rigid price p, such that pN (c, n) ≤ p ≤ pc, in both high-
and low-cost periods. Otherwise there is at least one collusive/punishment subgame
where a firm will not conform to (3). Depending upon whether the cost state is high
or low in the initial period, firm i’s present discounted values of deviation profits if it
sets the same or lower price p ∈ [pN (c, n), pc] in the initial period and then conforms
to (3) thereafter are:
Ω
y
iH(p, p
c) ≡ πi(p, pc; c, n) + δ1−δ
?
θ
ω
π(p;n) + (1− θ
ω
)π(p; c, n)
?
(5)
Ω
y
iL(p, p
c) ≡ πi(p, pc;n) + δ1−δ [
λ
ω
π(p; c, n) + (1− λ
ω
)π(p;n)], (6)
respectively. The first terms on the right-hand side of (5) and (6) are the profits
from the initial periods. This profit is lower in (5) than (6), because per-period
profits are strictly decreasing in ct. The second terms are the expected discounted
profits from future periods, given p will be matched forever. When there is positive
correlation, the second term is lower in (5) than (6), but they are equal under zero
correlation.
The above implies that if ΩH(pc, pc) ≥ ΩyiH(p, pc) for all p ∈ [pN (c, n), pc], then
firm i will not deviate from pc by setting any such p in high-cost states. Likewise,
it will not deviate from pc by setting any such p in low-cost states if ΩL(pc, pc) ≥
Ω
y
iL(p, p
c) for all p ∈ [pN (c, n), pc]. We can write the slack in these constraints as:
ξ
y
iH(p, p
c) ≡ −[πi(p, pc; c, n)− π(pc; c, n)]
+ δ1−δ
?
θ
ω
[π(pc;n)− π(p;n)] + (1− θ
ω
)[π(pc; c, n)− π(p; c, n)]
?
ξ
y
iL(p, p
c) ≡ −[πi(p, pc;n)− π(pc;n)]
+ δ1−δ
?
λ
ω
[π(pc; c, n)− π(p; c, n)] + (1− λ
ω
)[π(pc;n)− π(p;n)]
?
,
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respectively. Consider the difference between the two. After some rearranging and
cancellation, we find:
ξ
y
iH(p, p
c)− ξyiL(p, pc) = c[qi(p, pc;n)−
1
nq(p
c)] + δ
ω
(1− θ − λ) cn [q(p)− q(p
c)].
The first term on the right-hand side of the above is the difference between the
deviation gains, and the second term is the difference between the long-term losses
due to the price-matching punishment. It follows from the assumptions on demand
and 1 − θ − λ ≥ 0 that ξyiH(p, pc) > ξ
y
iL(p, p
c) for any p ∈ [pN (c, n), pc), so firm
i’s incentive to deviate is greatest in a period of low costs under zero and positive
correlation. This is because the deviation gain is largest and the long-term loss is
smallest when a firm deviates in a period of low costs. The latter effect, unlike the
former, is distinct from a similar model where firms follow optimal punishments.6
The reason for it in our model is that a matched price causes a smaller loss in per-
period profits when unit costs are lower, so the long-term loss is smaller when more
low-cost states are expected in the future, which is the case in a period of low costs
under positive correlation. Thus, if ξyiL(p, p
c) ≥ 0 for all p ∈ [pN (c, n), pc], then firm
i will not deviate from pc by setting any such p in low- and high-cost states.
Lemma 2 For every n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1) and 1 − θ − λ ≥ 0, there exists a unique
best rigid price, pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), that is supportable in both cost states if and only if
c ∈ (0,?c], where pN (c, n) < pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) < pm(c). Any rigid price pc such that
pN (c, n) ≤ pc ≤ pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) is also supportable.
When the difference between the two cost levels is sufficiently small, there exists
some rigid price pc that is above yet close enough to pN (c, n), such that a firm will not
deviate from pc in a collusive subgame that starts with a period of low costs. This is
because the deviation gain from setting any p between pN (c, n) and pc in a low-cost
state is outweighed by the long-term loss from matching p in all future periods.7 In
punishment subgames that start with a period of low costs, the condition for a firm
to want to deviate from p is the same as the condition to deviate from pc, except
the price is lower. Since the standard properties of the underlying competition game
imply that it is less profitable to deviate from a price close to pN (c, n) than a higher
price, a firm will not deviate in any such punishment subgame, if it will not deviate
from pc in the collusive subgame. Furthermore, this and the analysis above implies
6This is because under optimal punishments the long-term loss is larger when the future collusive
profits are greater, since profits are zero in the punishment phase. Consequently, the long-term loss
would be largest when a firm deviates in a period of low costs under positive correlation.
7Furthermore, it is never profitable to deviate from a rigid price above pN (c, n) to a price below
pN (c, n) in a period of low-costs for all c ∈ (0,?c].
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that a firm will also not deviate from pc or from any rigid price between pN (c, n) and
pc in subgames that start with a period of high costs. Consequently, the punishment
is credible and harsh enough to support pc in both cost states, when pc is sufficiently
close to pN (c, n) and when the difference between the two cost levels is sufficiently
small.
The best rigid price has the unique property that a small deviation from it in
a period of low costs that is matched in all future periods balances the first-order
increase in the deviation profit with the first-order decrease in future profits (i.e.
the argument maximising (6) is pc). This implies that the (unconstrained) optimal
‘deviation’ price from the best rigid price in a period of low costs is equal to the
best rigid price. At any rigid price above this level, there is an incentive to deviate
in a period of low costs (i.e. for any pc > pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), then ξ
y
iL(p, p
c) < 0 for
some p < pc). Since it is less profitable to deviate in a period of high costs than
one of low costs, the (constrained) optimal ‘deviation’ price from the best rigid price
in a period of high costs also equals the best rigid price.8 The best rigid price is
equivalent to the best collusive price analysed by Lu and Wright (2010) as c → 0,
and it is strictly increasing in the level of high costs. The reason is that a given rigid
price is easier to support in a period of low costs when the high-cost level is closer
to ?c than when it is close to zero, because the long-term loss from a small deviation
increases with c. In contrast to Lu and Wright (2010), the monopoly price of the
low-cost state may be supportable. This is because a small deviation from pm in a
period of low costs can balance the first-order increase in the deviation profit with
the first-order decrease in future profits of high-cost states.9
4.1.2 Best collusive prices and price rigidity
The best collusive prices are rigid if a firm will deviate from any procyclical or
countercyclical prices that would be more profitable than setting the best rigid price
in both cost states. To see that such countercyclical prices are not supportable,
suppose that the initial collusive prices are p(0) and p(c) for low- and high-cost states,
respectively, where p(0) is above p(c). A necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
such prices to be more profitable than setting the best rigid price in both cost states
is that p(0) must be strictly greater than the best rigid price. Consider firm i’s
incentive to deviate in a period of low costs. Firm i’s present discounted value of
8A firm would want to deviate from the best rigid price to a higher price in a period of high
costs, if firms matched such a deviation price in all future periods. However, this would not be a
credible strategy even if such deviations were matched, because a firm would want to deviate from
such a price in punishment subgames that start with a period of low costs when the price should
be matched.
9There is no first-order decrease in the profits of future low-cost states, because such profits
are flat at pm. It is this feature that determines that pm is not supportable by price-matching
punishments, when all future periods are expected to have low costs.
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deviation profits if it sets the same or a lower price p ∈ [p(c), p(0)] in the initial
period, then conforms to (3) thereafter is:
ΩxiL(p, p(0), p(c)) ≡ πi(p, p(0);n) + δ1−δ [
λ
ω
π(p(c); c, n) + (1− λ
ω
)π(p;n)].
Thus, a firm will not deviate from p(0) by setting p if ΩL(p(0), p(c)) ≥ ΩxiL(p, p(0), p(c))
for all p ∈ [p(c), p(0)], where the slack in this constraint is:
ξxiL(p, p(0)) ≡ −[πi(p, p(0);n)− π(p(0);n)] + δ1−δ (1−
λ
ω
)[π(p(0);n)− π(p;n))].
Notice that ξxiL(p, p(0)) does not depend on p(c), because the punishment results in
firms still setting p(c) in high-cost states, and as a consequence it is the same as
ξ
y
iL(p, p(0)), except that there is no long-term loss in profits of future high-cost states.
This implies that since it is profitable for a firm to deviate from a rigid price above the
best rigid price in a period of low costs, then an otherwise identical deviation is even
more profitable when prices are countercyclical (i.e. for any p(0) > pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ),
ξxiL(p, p(0)) < ξ
y
iL(p, p(0)) < 0 for some p < p(0)). Therefore, the best collusive
prices cannot be countercyclical.
Now consider whether the best collusive prices can be procyclical, where p(c)
is above p(0). First consider how this affects the best collusive price of the low-
cost state, denoted p∗(0) ∈ [pN (c, n), pm]. Notice that firm i’s present discounted
value of deviation profits is equivalent to (6), if it deviates from p(0) to some p ∈
[pN (c, n), p(0)] in a period of low costs. Thus, such a deviation is not profitable
if ΩL(p(0), p(c)) ≥ ΩyiL(p, p(0)) for all p ∈ [pN (c, n), p(0)]. Since ΩL(p(0), p(c))
increases with p(c) but ΩyiL(p, p(0)) is independent of p(c), then there is still no
incentive to deviate from the best rigid price when prices are procyclical. However,
a price above the best rigid price is not supportable in low-cost states, because the
punishment for such a price is not credible. This is because for any such price there
are some punishment subgames where firms should match a price above the best
rigid price in all future periods, but each firm has an incentive to deviate from it
in such punishment subgames that start with a period of low costs. Consequently,
the best rigid price is the highest price that is supportable in low-cost states when
prices are rigid or procyclical. However, it is more profitable to set the monopoly
price when the best rigid price is above it, so p∗(0) is the lower of the best rigid
price and the monopoly price of the low-cost state for all c ∈ (0,?c].
Finally, to find whether procyclical prices are supportable, consider firm i’s in-
centive to deviate from p(c) above p∗(0) in a period of high costs, while holding the
collusive price of low-cost states fixed at p∗(0). Firm i’s present discounted value
of deviation profits if it sets the same or a lower price p ∈ [p∗(0), p(c)] in the initial
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period, then conforms to (3) thereafter is:
ΩxiH(p, p(c), p
∗(0)) ≡ πi(p, p(c); c, n) + δ1−δ
?
θ
ω
π(p∗(0);n) + (1− θ
ω
)π(p; c, n)
?
.
(7)
The first term on the right-hand side of (7) is the profit from the initial period.
The second term represents the expected discounted profits from future periods,
given p will be matched in future high-cost states but p∗(0) is set in future low-
cost states. It follows from this that firm i will not deviate from p(c) by setting
p if ΩH(p(c), p∗(0)) ≥ ΩxiH(p, p(c), p∗(0)) for all p ∈ [p∗(0), p(c)]. The slack in this
constraint is:
ξxiH(p, p(c)) ≡ −[πi(p, p(c); c, n)− π(p(c); c, n)] + δ1−δ (1−
θ
ω
)[π(p(c); c, n)− π(p; c, n))],
which does not depend on p∗(0) because the punishment results in firms still setting
p∗(0) in low-cost states.
To see that the best collusive prices can be rigid under price-matching punish-
ments, suppose firm i deviates from p(c) to p = p∗(0). Given the punishment is
limited to future high-cost states when such a deviation is matched, there is no
long-term loss for such a deviation when all future periods are expected to have low
costs (i.e. θ = 1 and λ = 0). Thus, each firm will have an incentive to deviate from
any p(c) above p∗(0), and the best collusive prices are rigid at p∗(0) for all c ∈ (0,?c].
Proposition 1 shows that the best collusive prices can still be rigid when high costs
persist into the future.
Proposition 1 For every n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1) and 1− θ− λ ≥ 0, there exists a unique
c∗ ∈ (0,?c) such that the best rigid price, pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), is the best collusive price in
both cost states if and only if c ∈ (0, c∗], where pN (c, n) < pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) < pm.
When the difference between the two cost levels is below the critical threshold, a
firm will want to deviate from a price above yet very close to the best rigid price in
high-cost states. To see this point, consider a deviation from such a p(c) to a price
equal to or just above p∗(0) in a period of high costs.10 Notice that ξxiH(p, p(c)) is
the same as ξyiL(p, p(c)) as c→ 0, except that there is no long-term loss in profits of
future low-cost states. This implies that since it is profitable to deviate from a rigid
price above the best rigid price in a period of low costs, then an otherwise identical
deviation is even more profitable in a period of high costs as c → 0 when prices
are procyclical (i.e. for any p(c) > pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), ξ
x
iH(p, p(c)) < ξ
y
iL(p, p(c)) < 0
for some p < p(c) as c → 0). As the level of high costs increases towards c∗, the
10 It is never profitable to deviate from any procyclical p(c) by setting a price below p∗(0) in a
period of high costs for all c ∈ (0,?c].
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profitability of such a deviation falls.11 However, a price above yet very close to the
best rigid price is not supportable until the level of high costs exceeds c∗.
Prices above yet very close to the best rigid price may not be supportable in high-
cost states, even though the best rigid price is always supportable. This is because
there is a discontinuity in the incentives to collude at p∗(0), which arises due to the
fact that a deviation from p(c) to a price that is equal to or just above p∗(0) only
lowers prices in future high-cost states. Consequently, such a deviation from a price
above yet very close to the rigid price in a period of high costs generates a much
smaller long-term loss than an otherwise identical deviation from the rigid price,
where price matching reduces the prices of all future periods. Yet, the deviation
gains are effectively the same for such deviations. As a result, for some positive
values of c, it can be the case that a deviation from a price above yet very close
to the best rigid price is strictly profitable in a period of high costs, even though a
deviation from the best rigid price is strictly unprofitable.
When the difference between the two cost levels is so large that the best collusive
price of the low-cost state is pm, the best collusive prices are procyclical. This is
because pm is the best collusive price of low-cost states, if the first-order increase
in the deviation profit from a small deviation from pm in a period of low costs is
outweighed by the first-order decrease in profits of future high-cost states (there is
no first-order decrease in profits of future low-cost states, since such profits are flat
at pm). In comparison to this, a small deviation from a price above yet very close to
pm in a period of high costs leads to a smaller first-order increase in the deviation
profits and a (weakly) larger first-order decrease in profits of future high-cost states.
This implies that the best collusive prices will be procyclical, because a firm will not
deviate from a price above yet very close to pm in a period of high costs, if a firm
will not deviate from pm in a period of low costs.
4.2 Price rigidity and the expected duration of a high-cost phase
The best collusive prices are rigid when the difference between the two costs levels
is below the critical threshold. Proposition 2 now shows that this critical threshold
depends upon the extent to which a high-cost state is likely to persist into the
future. To see this point, define a high-cost phase as a sequence of high-cost states
that begins in a period where costs change from the low- to the high-cost state and
ends the period before they change back. The expected duration of a high-cost phase
is Σ∞t=1tθ(1 − θ)t−1 = 1/θ, which implies that the lower the probability that costs
11This is because the deviation gain strictly decreases and long-term loss strictly increases as the
level of high costs rises, due to the fact that high-cost states are less profitable than before; and
it is despite of the fact that the deviation occurs from a slightly higher price, since the best rigid
price strictly increases with the level of high costs.
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will change from the high- to the low-cost state in the following period, the longer
a high-cost phase is likely to last. Similarly, we can define a low-cost phase with an
expected duration of 1/λ.
Proposition 2 For every n ≥ 2, δ ∈ (0, 1) and 1− θ− λ ≥ 0, the critical difference
between the two cost levels, c∗, is strictly decreasing in the expected duration of a
high-cost phase.
As the expected duration of a high-cost phase increases, other things equal, it
is easier to support a price above yet very close to the best rigid price in high-cost
states. This comes about from two opposing effects. First, a direct effect reduces
the profitability of a small deviation from such a price. Second, an indirect effect
raises the profitability of such a deviation, because the deviation occurs from a
slightly higher price than before, since the best rigid price strictly increases with the
expected duration of a high-cost phase. Both effects are caused by the fact that the
punishment strategy leads to larger long-term losses when future periods are likely
to consist of more high-cost states. The direct effect dominates the indirect effect,
which implies that, for a given difference between the two cost levels, procyclical
prices are easier to support as the expected duration of a high-cost phase increases,
so the critical threshold falls. When there is zero correlation (so that the expected
duration of a low-cost phase decreases at the same rate as the expected duration
of a high-cost phase increases) both the direct and indirect effects are larger than
under positive correlation, but the direct effect still dominates.
We have already seen that the best collusive prices are rigid when a high-cost
phase is expected to last only one period and the following low-cost phase lasts
forever, provided the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the high-cost state is not
above the best rigid price (i.e. c∗ → ?c as θ → 1 and λ→ 0). On the other hand, when
a high-cost phase is expected to last forever, the best collusive prices are procyclical,
regardless of the expected duration of a low-cost phase (i.e. c∗ → 0 as θ → 0 for all
0 < λ < 1). This is because for such conditions it is more profitable to deviate from
a rigid price in a period of low costs than to deviate from a price above yet very
close to the rigid price in a period of high costs (i.e. as θ → 0, ξxiH(p, pc) > ξ
y
iL(p, p
c)
for all p < pc). Therefore, provided a firm will not deviate from the rigid price in
low-cost states, it will not deviate from a price above yet very close to the rigid price
in high-cost states.
4.3 Price rigidity and profits over the fluctuations
The preceding analysis showed that the best rigid price strictly increases with the
level of high costs. Proposition 3 shows that this implies that there are also general
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properties for the resultant collusive profits when the best collusive prices are rigid.
Proposition 3 For any c ∈ (0, c∗), per-period profits when costs are high (low) are
strictly decreasing (increasing) in the level of high costs, c, when firms set the best
rigid price. The present discounted values of collusive profits are strictly decreasing
in c when firms set the best rigid price in both states, whether the initial period has
high or low costs.
Clearly, per-period profits are greater in a low-cost state than in a high-cost
state, when firms set the best rigid price in both states. As the level of high costs
rises towards c∗, the difference in such profits becomes larger for two reasons. First,
per-period profits in low-cost states are larger than before, since the best rigid price
rises with the level of high cost but it remains below pm. Second, per-period profits
in high-cost states are smaller than before, because the best rigid price rises with
the level of high costs at a rate that is less than one-to-one. In contrast, the present
discounted values of collusive profits are equal when the high-cost level is equal to the
low-cost level, but such profits fall as the high-cost level rises towards c∗, regardless
of whether the initial period has low or high costs.
5 An Example
We complement the above analysis by assuming that demand is derived from the con-
stant elasticity of substitution version of Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences (Spence,
1976; and Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). We do this for three reasons. First, we want to
show that the best collusive prices are rigid for reasonably large differences in the
two cost levels. Second, we want to investigate the effect of the degree of product
differentiation on such price rigidity. To the author’s knowledge, there is no other
model of collusive price rigidity that considers this, since both Athey et al (2004)
and Hanazono and Yang (2007) analyse homogeneous products. Third, we want to
investigate the effect of the number of firms in the market on such price rigidity,
and this ultimately depends upon the degree of product differentiation. We use
Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, because it falls into the class of our general model
and it generates results with simpler intuition than alternatives, since it isolates
the competitive effects of product differentiation as there is no market expansion
effect.12
12Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences is one example of differentiated demand analysed by Kühn
and Rimler (2007) for collusion models under Nash reversion and optimal punishment strategies.
It has not been analysed for collusion under price-matching punishments before. Similar results
as those presented here can be derived using the standard Bertrand competition model with linear
demands.
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A representative consumer’s utility function is U(x) = n
1−κ
1−κ
?
1
nΣx
1−φκ
i
? 1−κ
1−φκ
+m,
where x is the vector of consumption of the n products, m is expenditure on other
goods, φ ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of product differentiation, where products are
less differentiated the closer φ is to zero, and κ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter. It follows
from this utility function that the direct demand function for firm i is:
qi(pi,p−i,φ, n) =
1
n
p
− 1κ
i
?
n
Σj (pi/pj)
1−φκ
φκ
? 1−φ
1−φκ
.
This implies that total demand at equal prices is independent of both the degree of
product differentiation and the number of firms, i.e. q(p) = p−1/κ. It is straightfor-
ward to show that the monopoly price is pm(ct) = ct/(1− κ) and that the one-shot
Nash equilibrium price is pN (ct, n,φ) = ct/
?
1− κ/
?
1 + 1−φ
φ
n−1
n
??
. To ensure that
the monopoly price is above the one-shot Nash equilibrium price for both cost states,
we assume that the level of low costs is c ∈ (0, c) and we normalise the high-cost
level relative to the low-cost level later.
For this example, the best rigid price is:
pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ,φ) =
c
1−κ/
?
1+(1−δ) 1−φφ
n−1
n
? + δλ(c−c)
ω
?
1−κ+(1−δ) 1−φφ
n−1
n
? , (8)
which applies for c < c ≤ ?c.13 The first term on the right hand-side of (8) is
equivalent to the best collusive price analysed in Lu and Wright (2010) and the
second term captures the effect of varying costs. This price equals c when products
are homogeneous, and it is everywhere strictly increasing in the degree of product
differentiation, φ. It is above the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the low-cost
state for all 0 < φ ≤ 1, and it is above the monopoly price of the low-cost state when
products are not substitutable. It is everywhere strictly decreasing in the number of
firms, n, but it is always above the one-shot Nash equilibrium price of the low-cost
state, even when there is a large number of firms in the market.14
The price in (8) defines the best collusive price in both cost states when the
difference between the two cost states is below the critical threshold. It follows from
Proposition 1 that c∗ = c1−K ∈ (c,?c) where:
K ≡ κ
δθ
ω (1−δ)
1−φ
φ
n−1
n?
(1−κ)(1− δθω )+(1−δ)
1−φ
φ
n−1
n
??
1− δλω +(1−δ)
1−φ
φ
n−1
n
? ∈ (0, 1).
13Following Lemma 1, ?c =
?
1− κ/
?
1 + 1−φφ
n−1
n
??
c
1−κ(1− δλω )/
?
(1−δ)
?
1+ 1−φφ
n−1
n
?
+δ(1− λω )
? .
14This is because the underlying competition game is one of true monopolistic competition, where
the price is above marginal cost even as n→∞.
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To illustrate the properties of c∗, Figure 2 plots Δc∗ ≡ c
∗−c
c =
K
1−K as a function
of φ for three levels of n. This has two interpretations. First, Δc∗ is the critical
proportional difference between the two cost states, where the best collusive prices
are rigid for any proportional difference that does not exceed this level. Second, it
measures proportional difference between the monopoly price when the cost state is
c∗ and the monopoly price of the low-cost state (i.e. [pm(c∗)−pm(c)]/pm(c) = Δc∗).
Parameter values are chosen such that the monopoly price of the low-cost state is
equal to unity, future costs are independent of the current level, and each cost state
is equally likely in any future period.
Figure 2: (c = 0.5, λ = 1− θ = 0.5, κ = 0.5, δ = 0.9)
The Figure shows that there is a non-monotonic relationship betweenΔc∗ and the
degree of product differentiation. For certain intermediate degrees of differentiation,
the best collusive prices are rigid when the monopoly price of the high-cost state is
16% higher than the monopoly price of the low-cost state, and such price rigidity
can occur for even larger differences between the two cost levels when the expected
duration of a high-cost phase is shorter.15 The best collusive prices are not rigid
when products are homogeneous or when each product has no close substitutes.
This is because the punishment strategy does not support collusive prices when the
products are homogeneous, since an infinitesimally small deviation from the collusive
price captures the whole market and the price-matching strategy leads to virtually
no long-term loss. Consequently, firms set the one-shot Nash equilibrium price in
each cost state. In contrast, firms can set the monopoly price in each cost state
15For example, if λ = 0.01 and θ = 0.99, the shape of Δc∗ is similar to that of Figure 2, except
that the best collusive prices can be rigid when the monopoly price of the high-cost state is 40%
higher than the monopoly price of the low-cost state.
21
when they are local monopolies, with no close substitutes.
Finally, Figure 2 shows that Δc∗ is larger for concentrated markets, with few
firms, than for less concentrated markets, with a greater number of firms, when the
degree of product differentiation is sufficiently low; the opposite relationship may
exist otherwise. This is not inconsistent with empirical research that shows that
prices are less responsive to changes in market conditions in some cases when the
markets are more concentrated (see Dixon, 1983; Carlton, 1986; Bedrossian and
Moschos, 1988; Geroski, 1992; Weiss, 1995) but the opposite relationship exists in
others (see Domberger, 1979; and Kardasz and Stollery, 1988). The reason behind
this result in our model is that it can either be more or less profitable to deviate
from a price above yet very close to the best rigid price in a period of high costs,
as the number of firms increases. This is because there are two opposing effects.
First, a direct effect raises the profitability of a small deviation from such a price.
Second, an indirect effect reduces the profitability of such a deviation, because the
deviation occurs from a slightly lower price than before, since the best rigid price
strictly decreases with the number of firms in the market. Both effects are caused
by the fact that the deviation gains are larger and the punishment strategy leads to
smaller long-term losses when there are a greater number of firms in the market (from
Assumption 4 and symmetric demand, respectively). In our general framework, it
is not possible to sign the overall effect. In our example, however, the indirect effect
dominates the direct effect when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently
low. This implies that, for a given difference between the two cost levels, procyclical
prices are easier to support as the number of firms in the market increases, so the
critical threshold falls.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we analysed an infinitely repeated game where unit costs alternate
stochastically between low and high states and where firms employ a price-matching
punishment strategy. This provided game theoretic support for the results of the
kinked demand curve, because we showed that the best collusive prices can be rigid
over time when the difference between the two costs levels is below some critical
threshold. Moreover, we showed that this critical threshold is closer to zero as
high-cost states are likely to persist for longer into the future, and it equals zero
when the high-cost state is expected to last permanently. When the best collusive
prices are rigid over time, the best rigid price is always between the one-shot Nash
equilibrium price of the high-cost state and the monopoly price of the low-cost state,
and it monotonically increases with the level of high costs at a rate that is less than
one-to-one. As a result, an increase in the level of high costs raises the resultant per-
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period profits of a low-cost state, but it reduces such per-period profits of a high-cost
state. Nevertheless, the corresponding present discounted values of collusive profits
are decreasing in the level of high costs, whether the initial period has high or low
costs. Finally, when demand is derived from the constant elasticity of substitution
version of Spence-Dixit-Stiglitz preferences, we found that the best collusive prices
are rigid for the largest difference between the two cost levels when products are
differentiated by an intermediate degree; and that the best collusive prices are rigid
for a larger difference between the two cost levels in a concentrated market than in
a less concentrated market, when the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently
low.
Throughout the paper, we have considered only two cost states, but periods of
price rigidity are not restricted to this special case. For example, when a medium-
cost state is added and there is zero correlation, the best rigid price is unaffected by
the introduction of the third state, if the expected level of future costs is unchanged
compared to the two-state model. Moreover, holding the expected level of future
costs constant also ensures that future high-cost states are less likely in this three-
state model than the two-state model. As a result, there is a greater incentive to
deviate from a procyclical price in a period of high costs in this three-state model
than the two-state model, when such a deviation only leads to a long-term loss in
profits of future high-cost states. Thus, when the difference between the low- and the
high-cost states is such that the best collusive prices are rigid in the two-state model,
the best collusive prices in this three-state model will either be rigid for every cost
state or partially rigid (where the best collusive prices are rigid in medium- and high-
cost states, at a price above the best collusive price of low-cost states). Applying
this logic to more than three cost states suggests that it is even more difficult to
support procyclical prices in the highest-cost state than in the two-state model, so
periods of price rigidity can occur for any number of states.
Finally, an important avenue for future research is to investigate whether there
exists any circumstances where firms will choose to support collusive prices through a
weaker punishment, such as price matching, rather than harsher punishment strate-
gies, such as Nash reversion or optimal punishment strategies. Such a theoretical
justification for price matching may provide a better indication of the industry char-
acteristics where price rigidity is likely to prevail. It would also resolve the tension
between the informal reasoning behind the belief that firms will employ the harsh-
est credible punishment with the evidence that, at least in some situations, tacitly
colluding firms (and even some cartels) do not employ such punishments.
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A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose the collusive price is pN (c, n) in both cost states.
To prove subgame perfection, it suffices to check that there is no history that leads
to a subgame in which a one-stage deviation is profitable. For every history, the
lowest ever deviation price below pN (c, n) at some period τ is min{pdτ , pN (c, n)}. If
min{pdτ} ≤ pN (n), then (3) trivially defines a Nash equilibrium in the subsequent
punishment subgames, whether they start with a period of high or low costs. Other-
wise, the subsequent punishment subgames are identical to a history in which firms
had set pN (c, n) in high-cost states and min{pdτ , pN (c, n)} ∈ (pN (n), pN (c, n)] in
low-cost states. Clearly, (3) defines a Nash equilibrium in the subgames that start
with a period of high costs. Thus, we must find the conditions for which a firm will
not deviate from pN (c, n) or from any price between pN (n) and pN (c, n) in subgames
that start with a period of low costs.
Suppose we consider some collusive price p ∈ (pN (n), pN (c, n)] that is set in
low-cost states, where pN (c, n) is set in high-cost states. Consider firm i setting the
same or a lower price pi ∈ [pN (n), p] in a period of low costs. From (4) define:
ΔΩzL(p) ≡
?
∂πi(pi,p;n)
∂pi
+ δ1−δ (1−
λ
ω
)dπ(pi;n)dpi
?
pi=p
.
Firm i will not deviate from p ifΔΩzL(p) ≥ 0, otherwise ΩL(p, pN (c, n)) < ΩziL(pi, p, pN (c, n))
for some pi < p. We wish to show that if ΔΩzL(p
N (c, n)) ≥ 0, then ΔΩzL(p) ≥ 0 ∀
p ∈ (pN (n), pN (c, n)). Differentiating ΔΩzL(p) with respect to p yields:
d(ΔΩzL(p))
dp =
?
∂2πi(pi,p;n)
∂p2i
+
?
j =i
∂2πi(pi,p;n)
∂pi∂pj
+ δ1−δ (1−
λ
ω
)d
2π(pi;n)
dp2i
?
pi=pj=p
.
It follows from (2) and Assumption 5 that d(ΔΩ
z
L(p))
dp < 0. Hence, if ΔΩ
z
L(p
N (c, n)) ≥
0, then ΔΩzL(p) > 0 ∀ p ∈ (pN (n), pN (c, n)). Thus, a firm will not deviate from a
price between pN (n) and pN (c, n), if it will not deviate from pN (c, n).
There exists a unique ?c ∈ (0, c) such thatΔΩzL(pN (?c, n)) = 0 becauseΔΩzL(pN (n)) >
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0, ΔΩzL(p
N (c, n)) = ΔΩzL(p
m) < 0 and:
d(ΔΩzL(pN ))
dc =
?
d(ΔΩzL(p))
dp
dpN
dc
?
p=pN (c,n)
< 0,
since d(ΔΩ
z
L(p))
dp < 0 and
dpN
dc > 0. Thus, ΔΩ
z
L(p
N (c, n)) ≥ 0 if and only if c ∈ (0,?c].
The above analysis implies that pN (c, n) and p, such that pN (n) < p ≤ pN (c, n), are
supportable in high- and low-cost states, respectively, if and only if c ∈ (0,?c].
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose the collusive price is pc in both cost states. To prove
subgame perfection, it suffices to check that there is no history that leads to a sub-
game in which a one-stage deviation is profitable. For every history, the lowest ever
deviation price below pc at some period τ is min{pdτ , pc}. If min{pdτ , pc} ≤ pN (c, n),
then (3) defines a Nash equilibrium in the subsequent punishment subgames, whether
they start with a period of high or low costs, if and only if c ∈ (0,?c] (from Lemma
1). Otherwise, the subsequent punishment subgames are identical to a history in
which firms had set min{pdτ , pc} ∈ (pN (c, n), pc] in both high- and low-cost states.
Thus, we must find the conditions for which a firm will not deviate from pc or from
any rigid price between pN (c, n) and pc in subgames that start with a period of high
or low costs.
Suppose we consider some collusive price p ∈ (pN (c, n), pc] that is set in both
cost states, where c ∈ (0,?c]. First, consider firm i setting a lower price pi ∈
[pN (n), pN (c, n)] in a period of low costs, so its present discounted value of devi-
ation profits are given by (4). It is more profitable to deviate from p to pN (c, n)
than to any price below pN (c, n), because ΔΩzL(p
N (c, n)) ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈ (0,?c] and prices
are strategic complements. Thus, we must consider deviations where firm i sets the
same or a lower price pi ∈ [pN (c, n), p]. From (5) and (6), respectively, define:
ΔΩ
y
H(p) ≡
?
∂πi(pi,p;c,n)
∂pi
+ δ1−δ
?
θ
ω
dπ(pi;n)
dpi
+ [1− θ
ω
]dπ(pi;c,n)dpi
??
pi=p
ΔΩ
y
L(p) ≡
?
∂πi(pi,p;n)
∂pi
+ δ1−δ
?
λ
ω
dπ(pi;c,n)
dpi
+ [1− λ
ω
]dπ(pi;n)dpi
??
pi=p
.
Firm i will not deviate from p in a period of low costs if ΔΩyL(p) ≥ 0, otherwise
ξ
y
iL(pi, p) < 0 for some pi < p. We wish to show that if ΔΩ
y
L(p
c) ≥ 0, then ΔΩyL(p) ≥
0 and ΔΩyH(p) ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ (pN (c, n), pc]. First, differentiating ΔΩ
y
L(p) with respect
to p yields:
d(ΔΩyL(p))
dp =
?
∂2πi(pi,p;n)
∂p2i
+
?
j =i
∂2πi(pi,p;n)
∂pi∂pj
+ δ1−δ
?
λ
ω
d2π(pi;c,n)
dp2i
+ [1− λ
ω
]d
2π(pi;n)
dp2i
??
pi=pj=p
.
It follows from (2) and Assumption 5 that d(ΔΩ
y
L(p))
dp < 0. Hence, if ΔΩ
y
L(p
c) ≥ 0,
then ΔΩyL(p) > 0 ∀ p ∈ (pN (c, n), pc). Thus, if firm i will not deviate from pc in a
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period of low costs, then it will not deviate from a lower rigid price between pN (c, n)
and pc. Next, consider:
ΔΩ
y
H(p)−ΔΩ
y
L(p) = −
?
c∂qi(pi,p;n)
∂pi
+ δ
ω
(1− θ − λ) cn
dq(pi)
dpi
?
pi=p
.
Assumption 1 and 1−θ−λ ≥ 0 imply that the above is positive. So, if ΔΩyL(pc) ≥ 0,
then ΔΩyH(p) > ΔΩ
y
L(p) ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ (pN (c, n), pc]. Thus, firm i will also not deviate
from pc or any rigid price between pN (c, n) and pc in a period of high costs.
Given d(ΔΩ
y
L(p))
dp < 0, there exists a unique best rigid price, p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ), which
is the level of p that solves ΔΩyL(p) = 0. It satisfies p
N (c, n) < pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) <
pm(c) since ΔΩyL(p
N (c, n)) > ΔΩzL(p
N (c, n)) ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈ (0,?c] and ΔΩyL(pm(c)) <
0. The above analysis implies that any rigid price pc such that pN (c, n) < pc ≤
pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) is supportable if and only if c ∈ (0,?c].
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose the collusive prices are p(0) and p(c) >
p(0) in low- and high-cost states, respectively, where without loss of generality let
p(0) > pN (c, n). To prove subgame perfection, it suffices to check that there is
no history that leads to a subgame in which a one-stage deviation is profitable.
For every history, the lowest ever deviation price below p(cτ ) at some period τ is
min{pdτ , p(cτ )}. If min{pdτ} ≤ pN (c, n) < p(0), then (3) defines a Nash equilibrium
in the subsequent punishment subgames, whether they start with a period of high
or low costs, if and only if c ∈ (0,?c] (from Lemma 1). If pN (c, n) < min{pdτ} ≤ p(0),
then (3) defines a Nash equilibrium in the subsequent punishment subgames, whether
they start with a period of high or low costs, if and only if p(0) ≤ pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ)
(from Lemma 2). Otherwise, the subsequent punishment subgames are identical to
a history in which firms had set min{pdτ , p(c)} ∈ (p(0), p(c)] in high-cost states and
p(0) in low-cost states. Thus, to find when procyclical prices are supportable, we
must find the conditions for which a firm will not deviate from p(c) or from any
price between p(0) and p(c) in subgames that start with a period of high costs.
Moreover, we have to check that a firm will not deviate from p(0) ≤ pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ)
when p(c) > p(0) in subgames that start with a period of low costs.
Suppose we consider some collusive prices such that p(0) > pN (c, n) is set in
low-cost states and p ∈ (p(0), p(c)] is set in high-cost states, where c ∈ (0,?c].
Furthermore, recall that there are punishment subgames in which a firm will not
conform to (3) for any p(0) above pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), so it must be the case that
p(0) ≤ pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ). Consider firm i deviating from such a p(0) in a period of
low costs. It is not profitable to set a higher price, because this decreases profits
in the initial period and it decreases profits of future high-cost states. Moreover, it
is not profitable to deviate to pi ∈ [pN (c, n), p(0)], because given ΩL(p(0), p(0)) ≥
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Ω
y
iL(pi, p(0)) ∀ pi ∈ [pN (c, n), p(0)] if p(0) ≤ p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ) (from Lemma 2), then
ΩL(p(0), p) > Ω
y
iL(pi, p(0)) for any such pi. Finally, it is not profitable to set
pi ∈ [pN (n), pN (c, n)) because it is more profitable to deviate from p(0) to pN (c, n)
than to any price below pN (c, n), since ΔΩzL(p
N (c, n)) ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈ (0,?c] and prices
are strategic complements. This implies that a firm will not deviate from any p(0),
such that pN (c, n) < p(0) ≤ pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), when p > p(0). Thus, the best collusive
price of the low-cost state is p∗(0) = min{pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), pm} ∀ c ∈ (0,?c].
Now suppose the collusive prices are p ∈ (p∗(0), p(c)] in high-cost states and
p∗(0) in low-cost states, where c ∈ (0,?c]. First, consider firm i setting a lower price
pi ∈ [pN (c, n), p∗(0)], so its present discounted value of deviation profits are given
by (5). It is more profitable to deviate from p to p∗(0) than to a price below p∗(0)
in a period of high costs, because ΔΩyH(p
∗(0)) > ΔΩyL(p
∗(0)) ≥ 0 ∀ c ∈ (0,?c] and
prices are strategic complements. Thus, we must consider deviations where firm i
sets the same or a lower price pi ∈ [p∗(0), p]. From (7), define:
ΔΩxH(p) ≡
?
∂πi(pi,p;c,n)
∂pi
+ δ1−δ (1−
θ
ω
)dπ(pi;c,n)dpi
?
pi=p
.
Firm i will not deviate from p if ΔΩxH(p) ≥ 0, otherwise ξxiH(pi, p) < 0 for some
pi < p. We wish to show that ifΔΩxH(p(c)) ≥ 0, thenΔΩxH(p) ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ (p∗(0), p(c)).
Differentiating ΔΩxH(p) with respect to p yields:
d(ΔΩxH(p))
dp =
?
∂2πi(pi,p;c,n)
∂p2i
+
?
j =i
∂2πi(pi,p;c,n)
∂pi∂pj
+ δ1−δ (1−
θ
ω
)d
2π(pi;c,n)
dp2i
?
pi=pj=p
.
It follows from (2) and Assumption 5 that d(ΔΩ
x
H(p))
dp < 0. Hence, if ΔΩ
x
H(p(c)) ≥ 0,
then ΔΩxH(p) > 0 ∀ p ∈ (p∗(0), p(c)). Thus, a firm will not deviate from a price
between p∗(0) and p(c), if it will not deviate from p(c). This implies that the best
collusive prices are procyclical when ΔΩxH(p
∗(0)) > 0, otherwise they are rigid over
time at p∗(0). Notice that ΔΩxH(p
m) > 0 if ΔΩyL(p
m) ≥ 0, so a firm will not deviate
from a price above yet very close to pm in a period of high costs when p∗(0) = pm.
Thus, the best collusive prices can only be rigid at pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) < p
m, and this
occurs if and only if ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) ≤ 0.
Finally, we must show that there exists a unique c∗ ∈ (0,?c) such thatΔΩxH(p
y
L(c
∗, n, δ,λ, θ)) =
0, where ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) ≤ 0 ∀ c ∈ (0, c∗]. First notice that c∗ > 0, because
limc→0ΔΩxH(p
c) < limc→0ΔΩ
y
L(p
c) ∀ pc ∈ [pN (c, n), pm], so limc→0ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) <
0 since limc→0ΔΩ
y
L(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) = 0. Next, consider:
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dc = −
?
∂qi(pi,p;n)
∂pi
+ δ(1−δ)
1
n [1−
θ
ω
]dq(pi)dpi −
d(ΔΩxH(p))
dp
dpyL
dc
?
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
= −
?
∂qi(pi,p;n)
∂pi
+ δ(1−δ)
1
n [1−
θ
ω
− α λ
ω
]dq(pi)dpi
?
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
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where α ≡ d(ΔΩ
x
H(p))/dp
d(ΔΩyL(p))/dp
> 0 and:
dpyL
dc =
1
d(ΔΩy
L
(p))
dp
δ
(1−δ)
1
n
λ
ω
dq(pi)
dpi
???
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
> 0.
If [1 − θ
ω
− α λ
ω
] > 0, then d(ΔΩ
x
H(p
y
L))
dc > 0, where α ≤ 1 is sufficient for this to be
true. Subtracting d(ΔΩ
y
L(p))
dp from
d(ΔΩxH(p))
dp yields:
−
?
c
?
∂2qi(pi,p;n)
∂p2i
+
?
j =i
∂2qi(pi,p;n)
∂pi∂pj
?
+ δ1−δ (1−
λ
ω
)d
2π(pi;n)
dp2i
+ δ
ω
(1− θ − λ)d
2π(pi;c,n)
dp2i
?
pi=pj=p
,
(9)
which is positive from Assumptions 3 and 5, and 1 − θ − λ ≥ 0, so α < 1. Hence,
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dc > 0, which implies that c
∗ is unique and that ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) < 0
∀ c ∈ (0, c∗). Finally, to see that c∗ < ?c, consider:
ΔΩxH(p)−ΔΩ
y
L(p) =
?
∂πi(pi,p;c,n)
∂pi
+ δ
ω
(1− θ − λ)dπ(pi;c,n)dpi −ΔΩ
z
L(p)
?
pi=p
. (10)
When evaluated at pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ), (10) is non-positive for all c ∈ (0, c∗]. Differenti-
ating (10) with respect to p yields (9), which is positive. This implies that (10) is
negative for all p ∈ [pN (c, n), pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ)). Thus, for (10) to be negative when
evaluated at pN (c, n), it follows that ΔΩzL(p
N (c, n)) > 0 since the first term on the
right-hand side of (10) is zero at pN (c, n) and the second is non-negative at pN (c, n)
∀ 1 − θ − λ ≥ 0. Given ΔΩzL(pN (?c, n)) = 0, then c∗ < ?c since
d(ΔΩzL(pN ))
dc < 0 (see
the Proof of Lemma 1).
Proof of Proposition 2. Totally differentiating ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) = 0 yields:
dc∗
dλ = −
1
d(ΔΩx
H
(p
y
L
))
dc
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dλ
dc∗
dθ = −
1
d(ΔΩx
H
(p
y
L
))
dc
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dθ
where d(ΔΩ
x
H(p
y
L))
dc > 0 (from the Proof of Proposition 1).
The total derivative of ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) with respect to λ ∀ 1 − θ − λ = 0
is:
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dλ =
?
δ
1−δ
dπ(pi;c,n)
dpi
+
d(ΔΩxH(p))
dp
dpyL
dλ
?
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
= δ1−δ
?
dπ(pi;n)
dpi
− (1− α) cn
dq(pi)
dpi
?
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
where α ≡ d(ΔΩ
x
H(p))/dp
d(ΔΩyL(p))/dp
∈ (0, 1) (from the Proof of Proposition 1) and:
dpyL
dλ =
1
d(ΔΩy
L
(p))
dp
δ
(1−δ)
c
n
dq(pi)
dpi
???
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
> 0.
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The total derivative of ΔΩxH(p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ)) with respect to θ ∀ 1 − θ − λ > 0
is:
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dθ = −
?
δ(1−δ(1−λ))
(1−δ)ω2
dπ(pi;c,n)
dpi
− d(ΔΩ
x
H(p))
dp
dpyL
dθ
?
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
= − δ
(1−δ)ω2
?
(1− δ[1− λ(1− α)])dπ(pi;c,n)dpi + αδλ
dπ(pi;n)
dpi
?
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
where:
dpyL
dθ = −
1
d(ΔΩy
L
(p))
dp
δ2λ
(1−δ)ω2
c
n
dq(pi)
dpi
???
pi=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
< 0.
It follows from Assumptions 1 and 5, and 0 < α < 1 that d(ΔΩ
x
H(p
y
L))
dλ > 0 and
d(ΔΩxH(p
y
L))
dθ < 0, so
dc∗
dλ < 0 ∀ 1− θ − λ = 0 and
dc∗
dθ > 0 ∀ 1− θ − λ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 3. It follows from (2) and Assumptions 1 and 5 that
dpyL
dc ∈ (0,
λ
ω
) (see the Proof of Proposition 1). This guarantees that per-period
profits are strictly increasing in c in low-cost states but they are strictly decreasing
in c in high-cost states, when such profits are evaluated at pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ).
Next, evaluate p(0) and p(c) in ΩL(p(0), p(c)) at p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ) and totally dif-
ferentiate with respect to c. This yields:
dΩL(pyL,p
y
L)
dc = −
?
δ
1−δ
λ
ω
q(p)
n −
?
j =i
∂πi(p,p;n)
∂pj
dpyL
dc
?
pj=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
= − δ1−δ
λ
ω
?
q(p)
n +
(p−c)
n
dq(p)
dp
1
−
d(ΔΩy
L
(p))
dp
Σj =i
∂qi(p,p;n)
∂pj
?
pj=p=p
y
L(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
The above is negative since dπ(p;c,n)dp =
q(p)
n +
(p−c)
n
dq(p)
dp > 0 when p is evaluated
at pyL(c, n, δ,λ, θ) ∈ (pN (c, n), pm), and
???d(ΔΩ
y
L(p))
dp
??? >
???dq(p)dp
??? > Σj =i ∂qi(p,p;n)∂pj . This
implies that each firm’s present discounted value of collusive profits is strictly de-
creasing in c in low-cost states.
Finally, evaluate p(c) and p(0) in ΩH(p(c), p(0)) at p
y
L(c, n, δ,λ, θ) and totally
differentiate with respect to c. This yields:
dΩH(pyL,p
y
L)
dc =
?
−
?
1 + δ1−δ (1−
θ
ω
)
?
q(p)
n +
dΩH(p)
dp
dpyL
dc
?
p=pyL(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
= −
?
q(p)
n
?
1− dp
y
L
dc
?
+ q(p)n
δ
1−δ
?
1− θ
ω
− dp
y
L
dc
?
− 1n
dq(p)
dp
dpyL
dc
?
(p− c) + δ1−δ (p− (1−
θ
ω
)c)
??
p=pyL(c,n,δ,λ,θ)
.
It follows from Assumption 1 and 0 < dp
y
L
dc <
λ
ω
≤ (1 − θ
ω
) < 1 ∀ 1 − θ − λ ≥ 0
that the above is negative. This implies that each firm’s present discounted value of
collusive profits is strictly decreasing in c in high-cost states.
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